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Abstract
This work presents an empirical study of the cumulative prospect theory using a Portuguese
sample. We estimate the value function and the probability weighting function with positive
and negative outcomes. The results confirm previous works that the value function is concave in
the gain domain and almost linear in the loss domain. Our results also show an inverse S-shape
for the probability weighting function in both loss and gain domain.
We also look into the relation of the coefficient from the already mentioned functions with
some demographic variables. It was possible to conclude that males are more willing to take
risks than females.
Finally, using the calculated coefficients we discuss the applicability of the results in the
context of financial markets. First we establish a bridge between the loss aversion coefficient
and the DOSPERT-scale, which will provide an easier way for financial institutions to present
the correct efficient portfolio for each individual. Second we apply the cumulative prospect
theory to the modern portfolio theory, for the Portuguese market. This will allow the financial
institutions to create an efficient portfolio of the market, taking into account the probabilities
distortions.
Abstract
Este trabalho apresenta um estudo emṕırico sobre cumulative prospect theory através do
estudo da função de utilidade e a função de probabilidade distorcida. Os resultados obtidos
estão de acordo com a literatura, que mostra que a função da utilidade é côncava no domı́nio
dos ganhos, e quase linear no domı́nio das perdas. Ñão só mostra que a função da probabilidade
distorcida tem a forma de um “S” inverso tanto no domı́nio dos ganhos como no domı́nio das
perdas. Também aborda o estudo de variáveis demográficas relacionando-as com os coeficientes
das funções mencionadas anteriormente, concluindo assim que os homens estão mais dispostos
a correr riscos do que as mulheres.
Por fim, através dos coeficientes calculados, foi posśıvel aplicar os resultados ao mercado
financeiro. Primeiro criando uma ponte entre o coeficiente de loss aversion e a escala de
DOSPERT, o que irá facilitar a determinação do carteira mais adequado para cada individuo.
Segundo, aplicando a cumulative prospect theory à modern portfolio theory para o mercado Por-
tuguês. Isto irá permitir que as instituições financeiras consigam determinar a carteira óptima
do mercado, tendo em conta as probabilidades distorcidas.
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1. Introduction
The expected utility theory is the most renown theory that describes the decision making
process of an individual with regard to uncertain outcomes. However, after some empirical work,
it has been demonstrated that this theory fails to correctly explain the risk preferences of an
individual. Some theories of non-expected utility have been proposed to explain these prefer-
ences, but the more prominent is the cumulative prospect theory by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992).
This theory differs from the expected utility theory in four important aspects: (i) the prefer-
ences are defined in terms of gains and losses instead of absolute wealth; (ii) decision makers are
more sensitive to small winnings compared to big winnings; (iii) losses seem larger than gains
and finally; (iv) people are more sensitive to extreme probabilities.
These discoveries of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have had big impact on the value and
weighting functions. As the expected utility theory has a utility function commonly represented
as concave and a linear probability function, the cumulative prospect theory has an S-shape
utility function that describes the conclusion (i), (ii) and (iii) and an inverse S-shape probability
weighting function that explains the fourth conclusion.
The change of the utility theory has had a big impact with regards to the risk decision making
process in a variety of disciplines, such as economics, finance and marketing. It is therefore of the
utmost importance to better understand this new theory, with regards to issues like: the kind
of human characteristics that can influence decisions, how it can be used, and how it is going to
change the theories that used the expected utility theory? These are the kind of questions this
work will aim to answer.
This work has four objectives. The first is to measure, for a Portuguese sample, the coeffi-
cients of the functional forms of cumulative prospect theory, in order to prove that the cumulative
prospect theory measures the risk preferences. The second objective is to find evidence of which
demographic variables have an impact on the coefficients previously calculated. The importance
of these results are to help financial institutions to know more about their market and give them
a chance to create better financial products that are more suitable to each demographic group.
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The calculation of the prospect theory coefficients is not a simple task, as it requires a lot
of calculations and a complex survey that entails a lot of explanation and is not accessible to
everyone. The third objective is to establish a bridge between the coefficient of loss aversion
and the DOSPERT-scale. Weber et al. (2002) have proposed the DOSPERT (Domain Specific
Risk Taking).
This scale has the objective of assessing the risk taking of an individual in five domains
(finance, health, recreational, ethical and social). In this scale, each individual rates the likeli-
hood of engaging in a specific activity considering the risk they are taking. Despite this scale
measure five domains, we will just focus on the field of finance. The benefit of creating a link
between this scale and prospect theory is the simplicity of applying this scale to an individual
and obtaining the loss aversion coefficient, as the traditional method to obtain this coefficient
requires a lot of calculations and assumptions. As said before, the first study of the DOSPERT
scale was proposed by Weber et al. (2002) with an English scale, and after that, many papers
were published with the translation of the same scale. In this case, since we are studying a
Portuguese sample, we are more interested in using the Portuguese DOSPERT-scale proposed
by Silva (2012).
The final objective of this work is to study the implication in financial markets of replacing
the expected utility theory for the cumulative prospect theory. As we know there are a lot of
theories that used the expected utility theory, however in this work we are more interested in
studying the financial domain. As so, we will study the differences in the efficient frontier of the
Portuguese market using cumulative prospect theory instead of the expected utility theory. With
this new market information, individually and globally, financial institutions will be provided
with much better information about their clients and what kind of products are more suitable
to them.
If we try to group these four objectives into one, we could say we are attempting to make an
implementation of the cumulative prospect theory over the expected utility theory in the chain
of risky choice. Starting individually where we present the risks to a group of individuals, and
end up with a global view of the financial markets.
This work is organised first with a literature review where we make an introduction to the
appearance of prospect theory and the functional forms that are more used nowadays and also
some results other authors have reached by applying the same theory to a general population.
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In section 3 it is described in great detail the procedure to accomplish the first two objectives
of this work. First is to explain how the survey was designed and which kind of aspects we have
to take into account. This part is followed by the methodology used to create the functional
forms of prospect theory and the model used to extract conclusions about the demographic
variables. Section 4 has the results from both the objectives mentioned before. In section 5
we have the applications of prospect theory to the other theories, meaning the results of the
DOSPERT-scale and the consequences of applying this theory to the efficient frontier. Finally
we have the conclusion in section 6.
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2. Literature Review
The expected utility theory is the most renown theory of risky decisions. However this
theory has been discredited by several authors like Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). This chapter will explore in great detail the development of prospect theory, from the
beginning (Expected Utility Theory) to the most recent (Cumulative Prospect Theory). It will
also describe in great detail the functional forms that are included in this last theory.
Making this study with a Portuguese sample is very helpful for the Portuguese financial
institutions as, to the best of our knowledge, this study belongs to a series of studies that apply
for the first time prospect theory to a Portuguese sample. These studies were develop by a
research team composed by master and PhD. students.
2.1 Theories
As said at the beginning of this chapter, the expected utility theory (EUT) is the theory
commonly used when an individual has to make a decision under risky conditions, where he is
faced with finite outcomes each of which has a respective probability of occurring.
The EUT asserts that the individuals try to maximise their expected utility taking into
account the probability of each outcome and their respective utility. Each person has a specific
utility curve. For example, the impact a wealthy person receiving an additional 100AC in their
monthly income will differ from that of non wealthy person receiving the same amount. That
is why to calculate the utility of a decision under risk we have to take into account the benefit
to the person that has to choose. The decision maker chooses the option with the highest EU,
which can be described as,
EU = p(w)u(w) (2.1)
where u(w) represents the utility of the new wealth level and p(w) the probability of reaching
that wealth level. There are three general shapes for the utility curve: concave, convex and
linear, which can be interpreted respectively as risk-averse, risk-seeking and finally a risk-neutral
person. However this theory is commonly represented with a concave utility function.
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Nevertheless many empirical studies show that there are some “anomalies” in this theory.
The biggest “anomaly” were presented by Allais (1953) and it is commonly known as the “Allais
Paradox”. This author showed that people are more sensitive to differences in the probabilities
near the extreme point (0% and 100%) than in the middle points (around 50%).
Another “anomaly” that the EUT can not take into account is the fourfold pattern of risk
attitudes: “risk seeking for low-probability gains and high-probability losses, coupled with risk
aversion for high-probability gains and low-probability losses”. This paradox, in particular risk
seeking for low-probability gains and risk aversion for low-probability losses, may explain the
attraction for gambling and insurance. Risk aversion for high-probability gains may contribute
to the preference for certainty whereas risk seeking for high-probability losses is consistent with
the common tendency to undertake risk to avoid facing sure losses.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed the Prospect Theory (PT) which takes into account
the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. Levy (1992) summarised the most
important aspects of this theory as follow:
1. People tend to think in terms of gains and losses instead of absolute wealth, therefore
the choices made by a person are codified in terms of deviations of the reference point.
The reference point can be seen as the status quo of an individual, i.e., the wealth that
an individual has at the moment of the choice. Another type of reference point could be
the aspiration level, in that case the gains and losses are measured by deviations from the
aspiration level.
2. People react differently to gains and losses. Normally they are risk-averse in the domain
of gains, and risk-seeking in the domain of losses. This has an impact in the value function
shape, suggesting that in the domain of gains, the curve is concave and in the domain of
losses the curve is convex. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) titled this phenomenon as the
reflection effect around the reference point. The reflection effect basically states that the
sensitiveness close to the reference point is elevated and it decreases as the distance from
the reference point increases, in both directions (losses and gains). This can only prevail
if the utility function is not strictly concave or convex in all domain.
3. Losses look larger than gains. This phenomenon is called loss aversion and implies that
“people prefer the status quo over a chance for positive and negative alternatives with the
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same absolute value”. Another phenomenon called endowment effect is when people give
more value to things they possess than to the equivalent but that they do not possess.
4. There is a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale, which has some consequences:
people overweight events with small probabilities and underweight events with higher
probabilities, i.e., changes in extreme probabilities (0% and 100%) have greater impact
then changes in the middle probabilities - certainty effect.
From this paper we can retrieve two important functions: the value function and the prob-
ability weighting function. The value function is the surrogate of the utility function in the
previous theory. This function is defined as deviations from the reference point, with v(0) = 0,
instead of measuring absolute wealth. Generally it is concave for gains and convex for losses,
having a S-shape form that implies a diminishing sensitivity as we move away from the reference
point (reflection effect). Finally, it is steeper in the losses than in the gains (loss aversion and
endowment effect). Figure 2.1(a) is a representation of an hypothetical value function. The
value function of a simple prospect that pays xAC with a probability p, otherwise nothing, is
given by:
V (x, p) = w(p)v(x) (2.2)
where v(x) measures the subjective value of the consequence x. The function w(p) measures
the impact of the probability p on the attractiveness of the prospect and is called probability
weighting function. From now on this kind of prospect is described by (x, p; 0).
The probability weighting function “measures the impact of the probability of an event
on the desirability of a prospect”. As showed in the equation 2.2 the value of the outcome
is not weighted by the probability of this occurring, but by a decision weight w(p). This
decision weight is the perception of the probability that a decision maker has towards a specific
probability. By definition w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. This function is nonlinear due to the fact
that individuals attribute more weight to events with small probabilities and less weight to the
higher probabilities (certainty effect) and a possible representation of this curve is presented on
figure 2.1(b)
Although this original theory has been much more successful in explaining the risk preferences
it still had some drawbacks: (i) it can only be applied to a maximum of two non-zero outcomes
and (ii) sometimes does not satisfy stochastic dominance. Both of these problems were solved
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(a) Value Function (b) Weighting Function
Figure 2.1: Hypothetical curves of original prospect theory
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) when they proposed the cumulative prospect theory (CPT).
The CPT instead of transforming each probability separately uses a separate cumulative
distribution functions for gains and losses. That is, an outcome x is not weighted by its prob-
ability but by the cumulative probability of obtaining an outcome at least as good as x if the
outcome is positive, and at least as bad as x if the outcome is negative. With this improvement
the CPT allows more than two nonzero outcomes and does not have the stochastic dominance
violation problem. The CPT also allows different weighting functions for losses (w(p)−) and
gains (w(p)+).
The value function of a prospect described by (x, p; y, q) can be:
Mixed Prospect: V = w−(p)v(x) + w+(p)v(y) if x < 0 < y ;
Pure Gain Prospect: V = [w+(p+ q)− w+(q)]v(x) + w+(q)v(y) if 0 ≤ x < y ;
Pure Loss Prospect: V = [w−(p+ q)− w−(q)]v(x) + w−(q)v(y) if y < x ≤ 0 ;
It is easy to note that if y = 0 the value function can be reduce to
V (x, p) = w(p)v(x) (2.3)
which is equal the value function of the PT (see equation 2.2).
A short but formal way to presented this theory is: The value function of a prospect with
outcomes x1 ≤ ... ≤ xk ≤ 0 ≤ xk+1 ≤ ... ≤ xn is given by:
V (f) = intki=1π
−






where V (f) is the value function strictly increasing and continuous satisfying v(0) = 0, and π−,







−(p1 + ...+ pi)− w−(p1 + ...+ pi−1) , 1 < i ≤ k
π+j = w
+(pj + ...+ pn)− w−(pj+1 + ...+ pn) , k < i < n
(2.5)
where w− and w+ is the probability weighting function for losses and gains respectively, satis-
fying w−(0) = w+(0) = 0 and w−(1) = w+(1) = 1, and both strictly increasing and continuous.
So after performing an empirical study Tversky and Kahneman (1992) concluded that: (1)
the prospects are framed in terms of gains and losses, (2) the value function is a two-part
cumulative functional, and (3) the value function is S-shaped and the probability weighting
function is an inverse S-shape equal to gains and losses. The inverse S-shape weighting function
favours risk seeking for small probabilities of gains and risk aversion for small probabilities of
loss. Figure 2.2 presents an hypothetical possibility for both value and weighting functions.
Figure 2.2: Hypothetical curves of cumulative prospect theory
2.2 Functional Forms
After the work mentioned above, several studies were made in order to study both value
function and probability weighting function. For this, several functional forms were proposed
in order to study which function fits better the data. In this section we make a review of the
functional forms that have received the most attention in the literature up to now. Starting
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with the value function and followed by the probability weighting function. See Stott (2006) for
an exhaustive study of the interaction of the functional forms. We also make same references
about loss aversion coefficients proposed by several authors.
As we know by the EUT, the value function was commonly described as a concave function
and that is why the first functions to appear did not have the S-shape proposed by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979). As so the logarithmic function (v(x) = ln(a + x)) is generally accepted
as the first utility function, having been proposed by Bernoulli (1954). It captures the notion
that marginal utility is proportional to wealth. Another value function form is the quadratic
(v(x) = ax−x2), that can be reformulated in terms of a prospect’s mean and variance, which is
convenient in finance models. The most important and most used value function in the literature




xα if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β if x < 0
(2.6)
where α, β > 0 measures the curvature of the value function for gains and losses, respectively,
and λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. As we have seen in the previous section, this function
is S-shaped being concave for gains and convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains.
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) proposed a generalisation of the utility function. This func-
tion is a composition of a loss aversion index λ > 0, reflecting the different processing of gains
and losses, and a basic utility u that reflects the intrinsic value of outcomes. Formally this is,
v(x) =

u(x) if x ≥ 0
λu(x) if x < 0
(2.7)
and u(x) depends of which functional form that is used. In this study u(x) = xα when x ≥ 0
and u(x) = −|x|β when x < 0.
The loss aversion coefficient which is incorporated in the value function explains the differ-
ences in preferences in the gain and loss domain. It is through the loss aversion coefficient that
we can transpose to the functional form the fact that losses look larger than gains resulting in
a utility function steeper for losses than for gains. However there is not a consensual definition
of loss aversion, so each author proposes a different way to calculate it. Despite the fact there
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is no formal definition accepted by all, this coefficient is very important as risk aversion plays
an important role in investment decisions.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were the first to propose a formulation for this coefficient
defined by −U(−x) > U(x) for all x > 0. When Tversky and Kahneman (1992) extended
PT to CPT, they had implicitly used −U(−$1) > U($1), which came from the power value
function they had chosen, and where they empirically obtained 2.25 value for the loss aversion.
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) also proposed a different formulation, as they argued that the




↑(0) stands for the left derivative and
U ′↓(0) for the right derivative of U at the reference point. Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) had
empirically found a value of 1.79.
A lot of other authors had proposed different formulations to the loss aversion coefficient
so for further discussion, see Abdellaoui et al. (2007). Appendix A.2 shows a table where it is
possible to find some empirical results for the coefficients of each functional form.
Finally, the probability weighting function arises with the Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
paper. However the first formulation only shows up in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). They
propose a single-parameter weighting function which is an inverse-S shape, with overweighting
of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate to high probabilities.
w(p) =
pγ




Some other authors have proposed different weighting functions. Lattimore et al. (1992)




δpγ + (1− p)γ
(2.9)
where δ = exp(τ)1. In the equation above, γ controls primarily the diminishing sensitiv-
ity(curvature) and δ the elevation. When the weighting function is more elevated (higher δ)
it implies less overall risk aversion for gains and more overall risk aversion for losses. The lower
the γ the more pronounced the curve is, which implies more rapidly diminishing sensitivity to
probabilities around the boundaries of 0 and 1, i.e., people become less sensitive to changes in
probabilities as they move away from the reference point. See figure 2.2 to see the variations of
1τ does not have a psychological interpretation, so we use the delta which is a transformation of τ and where
we can give a psychological meaning
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the probability weighting function.
Note: On the left the weighting functions differ primarily in curvature. On the right weighting functions differ
primarily in elevation
Figure 2.3: Variations of probability weighting functions
Another very known probability weighting function was proposed by Prelec (1998) which
functional differs from the above since it uses the exponential.
w(p) = exp[−δ(−ln(p))γ ] (2.10)
where δ,γ > 0. When δ = 1 the Prelec’s function collapses to a single parameter form: w(p) =
exp[−(−ln(p))γ ].
As referenced at the beginning of this chapter, Stott (2006) studied the interaction of the
value and weighting function in order to conclude which functional forms produce the best
results. He concluded that the best model has a power value function and the Prelec (1998)
weighting function. For this work we will use the power value function and the two coefficient
weighting function proposed by Lattimore et al. (1992). The reason we used this function has
to do with the psychological interpretation of the coefficient given by Gonzalez and Wu (1999).
The calculation of both these functions and the coefficient of loss aversion have some impor-
tant advantages. First of all, there are no studies about prospect theory with a sample made
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up by Portuguese population, so this work which is inserted in a project that will be the first
to identify the risk preferences for Portuguese individuals under the prospect theory. The ad-
vantage of having a deeper knowledge about an individual’s preferences is that it enables the
financial institution to better understand what level of risk a person is willing to take.
The loss aversion coefficient has an additional role in this study. Besides giving more in-
formation about risk preferences of an individual, it also fulfils a secondary objective which is
to find a relation with the DOSPERT scale2. The biggest advantage of finding this relation is
in the amount of work that each method requires. To calculate the coefficients of the prospect
theory function, a large amount of work is required whereas the DOSPERT scale is easier to
apply and making the task of determining which kind and amount of risk a person is willing to
take much easier to the financial institution
2Scale that assesses risk taking in five content domains: financial decisions (separately for investing versus
gambling), health/safety, recreational, ethical, and social decisions.
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3. Data & Methodology
The primary objective of this work is to estimate the functional forms of the CPT as regards
to the Portuguese population and the demographic differences that influence these same func-
tional forms. For that we need to develop a specific survey that will provide us the information
we need for the objective we have in hands. However it is very difficult to obtain a big enough
sample that can replicate the heterogeneity of the Portuguese population, so we decided to ob-
tain a sample using the Portuguese students from the Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão
(ISEG). Only after collecting all the information we need, can we actually start to analyse and
test which kind of curves and demographic properties the group has.
This chapter is divided in two sections, the first concerns the survey, how the questions were
formulated and some aspects we needed to take into consideration so the responses would not
deviate from the objective of the questions. The second part of the chapter is where we explain
how results were treated and how we obtained the coefficients we proposed to study and the
respective curves.
3.1 Survey
The experiment was conducted by an online survey to all students from ISEG. In most
cases this kind of survey is made in a laboratory experiment because usually the frequency of
errors in the lab experiment is drastically low, and so the results are more reliable. However
Von Gaudecker et al. (2008) showed that the differences between the results obtained in a lab
experiment or through an Internet platform are due to the selection of the candidates and not to
implementation mode. So as long as the Internet experiment has the same participant selection
as when the experiment is made in a lab, this problem can be overcome.
The survey was based on the Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Tversky and Fox (1995) and
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) procedure, i.e., based upon estimations of cash equivalents from a series
of choices. On a typical question in the gain domain, the computer displays a game (e.g. 50%
chance to win 50AC, otherwise nothing) and a table with four sure outcomes evenly spaced with
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two options to select, “save”and “play”. The intention was to get the respondent to indicate
his preferences, and choose for each outcome displayed whether he would prefer to save that
amount and not play the game or if he would prefer to discard the amount and take a chance on
the game. Once the preferences were selected, four new sure outcomes were presented linearly
spaced between the lowest value on the saving side and the higher choice on the playing side.
After selecting the new preferences with the same rule described above, the mid point of the
lowest value on the saving side, and the higher choice on the playing side was displayed on the
screen. This mid point is considered the certainty equivalent (CE).
We used the same procedure for the prospects in the loss domain, that is, when the game
was presented to the respondent he had to choose for each outcome if he would prefer to pay
that amount in order to avoid the possibility of having to pay a higher amount or if he would
like to gamble having the possibility of paying the higher amount or nothing. Finally, to link
the preferences of the gain domain with the loss domain it was necessary to estimate a certainty
equivalent with a mix prospect. To do so, the game had to include a gain and a loss outcome.
So in the survey two games were presented to the respondent; fifty-fifty chance of losing 20AC or
gaining 50AC, or fifty-fifty chance of losing 50AC or gaining an amount chosen by the respondent.
This amount chosen by the respondent have to turn this two games indifferent between them.
Appendix A.1 is a Portuguese explanation of the survey sent to the students.
This first part of the survey had seven games for the gain domain from where we could
calculate the functional forms of gains, seven games for the loss domain from where we could
calculate the losses functional forms and just one game for the mix prospect. The reason why
it was only necessary to ask one question for the mixed prospects is due to the fact that from
all the other fourteen questions we could obtain all the coefficients that we need except for the
loss aversion coefficient. So using the same approach as Abdellaoui et al. (2008) we only need
one equation to extract the loss aversion coefficient and thus one mix prospect game. However
a more detailed explanation is in the next section where we show the methodology we used to
calculate the loss aversion coefficient.
These fifteen questions were enough to calculate the functional forms we are interested in.
However, the higher number of questions, the more precise are the curves. But since incentives
were not given to the respondents, the survey could not be too extensive. For this reason we
only used fifteen games instead of the twenty five used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
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We decided not to use monetary incentives in accordance with Camerer and Hogarth (1999)
arguments and not due to budget constrains. They had said that “The data shows that incentives
sometimes improve performance, but often don’t”. They also said that incentives have a great
impact in surveys that require a mental effort like memorising and problem solving. However in
surveys that require only intuition, incentives can hurt the results because thinking harder can
distort our preferences. As choosing between risky choices is not a matter of cognitive function
but is about intuition so incentives will not affect mean performance. For these reason incentives
were not introduced into this survey, but the implication was a smaller number of questions so
respondents would not be discouraged and continue responding until the survey was completed.
There was a particularity on the survey. It could not prevent dominance violations. So after
collecting all the results it was necessary to delete the inconsistent observations. An inconsistent
observation is when the value of the sequence of stated outcome, for each individual, is not
strictly increasing. For the mixed prospects the rejection rule was for all observation where the
value input by the respondent was lower than the expected value. The down side of this approach
is when a person makes one single mistake the entire observation is lost which implies rejecting a
great number of observations. The up side of this approach is if an individual is consistent, that
is, respects the dominance, it is plausible to admit that the respondent completely understood
the questions, and his results will be highly reliable. So although there could be a large number
of rejected observations and thereby obtaining a small sample, we can assume that the remaining
observation are of excellent quality.
There was a second and a third part of the survey. The second part regards the DOSPERT-
scale and it will be explained in a chapter further ahead. The third part of the survey relates
to questions of the personal domain (e.g. age, gender and others).
3.2 Methodology
The CPT functional forms were calculated using the data obtained from the survey. As
so, it was necessary to make a thorough description of the methodology used to calculate the
coefficients for the probability weighting function, the value function and also the model used
to study the relation with the demographic variables.
Since there are two probability weighting functions, one for gains and another for losses, it
is necessary to estimate them separately. However, the methodology to calculate both is the
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same. The first thing to do is to retrieve the certainty equivalents (c) that were obtained in the
first part of the survey. Each question has a game like (x, p; 0) so using the 2.3 equation and
disregarding the value function, it is possible to reduce the same equation to simpler one, as
below:
w(p) = c/x (3.1)
Using the first part of the survey and applying the 3.1 equation it is possible to obtain
seven points of the probability weighting function. Once these seven points are calculated it
is possible to make a regression in order to estimate the parametric values of the probability
weighting function. The parametric form used was the proposed by Lattimore et al. (1992)
(equation 2.9)
After calculating the coefficients of the probability weighting function we can proceed to the
calculation of the value function. The elicitation of this function was divided into three stages.
The first step was to calculate the utility function in the gain domain hence using only the
positive prospects. Once again it is necessary first to calculate the points that are in the value
function in order to be able to apply the functional form. The points used in this approach were
the same as used in the estimation of the probability weighting function with the difference that
w(p) are the values obtained by the weighting function estimated previously. Using the equation
2.3 and 2.7 (in the gain domain) and taking into account that u(0) = 0 and to use the power
function it is necessary to scale u(1) = 1, the regression used was:
w(p) = (c/x)α (3.2)
The second stage is to calculate the utility curve in the loss domain. To do so, we use the
same method as used in the gain domain, with the difference that now the scaling is u(−1) = −1
and is the β coefficient that is being calculated. To calculate this parameter the prospects used
were the negative ones, i.e. prospects like (y, p; 0) when y < 0.
The third and the last step is to measure the loss aversion coefficient. For this coefficient
the mixed prospect was used. This prospect is like (x, p; y) when x > 0 and y < 0. In the
third part of the survey it was asked an amount (k) that made two mixed prospect equivalent




− + U(k)w(p)+ and applying the
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−λ(−y1)βw(p)− + xα1w(p)+ = −λ(−y2)βw(p)− + kαw(p)+
−λ(−y1)βw(p)− + λ(−y2)βw(p)− = −xα1w(p)+ + kαw(p)+
λ((−y1)βw(p)− + (−y2)βw(p)−) = −xα1w(p)+ + kαw(p)+
λ =





Once w(p)+, w(p)−, α and β are already calculated, λ can be easily calculated. This value
to the loss aversion coefficient is what Tversky and Kahneman (1992) had implicitly proposed,
and is defined as −U(−1)U(1) .
So far we have assumed that there are two probabilities weighting functions, and two value
functions, however al Nowaihi et al. (2008) affirmed “preference-homogeneity and loss-aversion
are necessary and sufficient for the value function to have the power form with identical pow-
ers for gains and losses and for the probability weighting functions for gains and losses to be
identical”. Preference homogeneity1 essentially implies that when all prizes in a lottery are
scaled up by a factor, say k, then the certainty equivalent of the lottery is also scaled up by
the same factor k (c(kf)=kc(f)). Tversky and Kahneman (1992) already affirmed that if the
power value function of the form presented on equation 2.6 holds, then preference homogeneity
is necessary and loss aversion implies that λ > 1. Hence from this paper it is possible to retract
that α = β and w(p)+ = w(p)−. As so, if we based our study in this latter theory, we do not
need to calculate the functions for the loss domain, which will drastically decrease the amount
of calculation required.
Finally to conclude the methodology for our first objective, we used a linear regression
to estimate which demographics variables have an impact in the prospect theory parameters.
The procedure used started by input all the demographic variables and secondly withdraw the
variable which presents a higher p-value. This procedure continues until all the variables have
a p-value lower than 10%. The only coefficient that does not oblige to this rule is the constant.
In the next section, we will provide the results for our first objective, this is, the coefficients
of CPT with a Portuguese sample. And also the results for the demographic variables.
1Definition taken from al Nowaihi et al. (2008)
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4. Results
After performing the survey the first thing we need to do is remove the inconsistent obser-
vations. This is, remove the observations that did not present a strictly increasing sequence
of outcomes regarding the prospects with gains and losses. In the loss aversion coefficient we
reject the choices that are below the expected value of the game. Removing from the sample the
inconsistent observations, from our sample of 159 responses only 31 (≈ 19%) held to be totally
consistent for the prospects in the gain and loss domain and also the mix prospect. On the other
hand, with the al Nowaihi et al. (2008) approach, there is no need to reject the inconsistencies
from the losses. Hence, we get a total of 33 consistent observations (≈ 21%).
In table 4.1 we show the statistics of the demographic variables. From this table we can
highlight that the sample is mostly constituted by males, aged between 18 and 23 years old,
that have finished the bachelor degree. Is no surprising that most of the students are from
economics, once the survey was implemented in an economics school.
Table 4.1: Sample statistics





18 to 23 19 61.3
24 to 30 8 25.8
> 30 4 12.9
Education
Undergraduate 6 19.4
Bachelor’s degree 15 48.4
Masters degree 6 19.4




Note: The table represents the sample distribution in terms of demographic variables. Each variable sums the
31 observation (100%).
The answers to the survey of this sample are represented in the table 4.2 with the median
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answer for each game. It is interesting to notice that almost all games in the loss domain are
higher (in absolute value) than the respective game in the gain domain. From here we can
already conclude that, for this sample, people are more risk taking in the loss domain that in
the gain.
Table 4.2: Certainty equivalent median
Probability
Outcome (AC) .05 .10 .25 .50 .75 .90 .95
(50,0) 8 25 40
(-50,0) - 10 - 25 - 39
(100,0) 8 24 58 78
(-100,0) - 12 - 30 - 66 - 88
Note: The two outcomes of each prospect are given in the left-hand side of each row; the probability of the first
outcome is given by the corresponding column. For example, the value of 8 AC in the upper left corner is the
median cash equivalent of the prospect (50AC, 0.10; 0, 0.90).
The median for the mixed prospect is 125 which is possible to denote that the gains must
be at least twice as large than the losses. This implies that the loss aversion coefficient should
be around 2. This is compatible with a value function that changes the slope abruptly at zero.
4.1 Functional forms
For the probability weighting function the δ and γ were estimated and the median of the
results are displayed in table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Estimated coefficients: Probability weighting function





The median of the coefficients estimated for each valid observation. The empirical average is obtained by the
average of the median for each coefficient which other authors have find.
The first thing that was made was to test if this estimated coefficient is significantly equal
to the average estimated in the literature (see table A.2). None of the four coefficients were
significantly different from their average. δ+ had a z=.534 with a p-value=.593; γ+ had a
z=1.025 with a p-value=.305; δ− had a z=1.041 with a p-value=.298 and γ− had a z= -1.211
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with a p-value=.226.
It was also tested if the median of δ+ could be equal to δ− and γ+ to γ− and the results of
the sign test were the same for the two test, and both did not have significantly different medians
(z=-1.510, p-value=.131 and z=-1.348, p-value=.177 respectively). When testing δ+ > δ− the
test was rejected at 10% (p-value=.066), meaning that the probability weighting function for
the losses is more elevated then the gains which are shown on figure 4.1. Which in psychological
terms means that people are more willing to take risk in the loss domain than in the gain
domain. The hypotheses of δ+ being higher than one was rejected with a 10% confidence (z=-
1.300, p-value=0.097). This implies subcertainty which is a property presented by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979). Subcertainty is when decision weights of complementary events sum less
then one (w(p) + w(1− p) < 1). Noting that the median of w+(0.5) = 0.424 we can prove that
there is subcertainty. This value is very close to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which is 0.421,
and they are not significantly differences (z = 0.201, p-value = 0.955).
When both parameter of γ where tested to be higher or equal to one the null hypotheses were
rejected (z=-10.090; p-value=.000 for gain and z=-6.632; p-value=.000), so it can be assumed
that these parameter are lower than one. Since the inverse S-shape of the probability weighting
function can only be achieved if γ < 1 it is possible to assume that both weighting functions
that were calculated in this work have an inverse S-shape. It is also possible to see this in figure
4.1.
After studying the coefficient of the probability weighting function, we studied the value
function coefficients. The estimated values are displayed on table 4.4.
It was tested if the coefficients of the power function could be equal to one and the result was
that α was rejected (z=-3.652; p-value=.001) but β was not (z=-.681; p-value=.503). This mean
that the value function can be linear in the loss domain, but we are sure that it is not linear for
the gain domain. Thus, we need to test if α could be lower than one, in order to conclude about
the concavity in the gain domain. This hypothesis was not rejected (p-value=1.000). Having
said this it is possible to conclude that the value function in the domain of gain is concave but
in the loss domain is near to the linearity.
Both α and β are not significantly equal to their ”empirical average”(z=4.766, p-value=.000
and z=4.312, p-value=.000 respectively) but this does not mean that some error has been made
in the methodology. Recent papers are proposing a utility curve closer to linearity (Abdellaoui
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Table 4.4: Estimated coefficients: Value function




. The median of the coefficients estimated for each valid observation.
et al. (2005) and Abdellaoui et al. (2008)) hence our estimates fall within the range of recent
estimates that find the power of the value function to be between 0.8 and 1.0. To test if the
previous statement is true the same test of equality of means were made but now with the
average value of the three last papers presented on the appendix A.2. So the test with the
recent mean did not rejected the equality of the means (z=-,209 p-value=.837 and z=0,087
p-value=.931 respectively) confirming the statement and making our results in line with the
literature.
The last test made to these two coefficients were if their median were equal (α = β). Once
the test was not rejected (p-value=0.189) the hypothesis only one curve existing for gains and
losses, proposed by al Nowaihi et al. (2008), may be sustained.
A classification to the utility functions was also made, to verify the proportion of the possible
utility shapes. The rule to calculate this was, all the observation with an α lower (higher) than
one are concave (convex) in the domain of gain. In the domain of loss, all the observation with
a β lower (higher) than one are convex (concave). We did not include the possibility of linearity
because neither coefficients could be exactly one. The table 4.5 demonstrate the respective
proportion.
Table 4.5: Classification of respondents
Losses
Concave Convex Total
Gains Concave 27% 50% 77%
Convex 14% 9% 23%
Total 41% 59% 100%
Note: A value function that is concave for gains and convex for losses have a α < 1 and β > 1
respectively. The reasoning is the same for other possible value functions.
There are some consideration to take from this table. First of all it is possible to notice that
the more common value function is the one that is convex in the loss domain and concave in
the gain domain, which is what is presented on the literature. It is also possible to see that in
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the gain domain 77% of the observation are concave, which increases the credibility that the
utility function has to be concave in the gain domain. However it is not possible to take the
same conclusion for the loss domain once the probabilities are quite balanced. With this kind
of results it is possible to conclude that the value function in the loss domain is closer to the
linearity.
There is still one coefficient remaining to conclude the first part of our work, the loss aversion
coefficient. The λ estimation was 1.256. This value is lower than the empirical average and when
tested if they were equal, the hypothesis was rejected at 5% level (z=-2.146; p-value=.040).
Despite the literature average is around two, recent findings, show that the value of λ is
lower than two showing once again that this result is in agreement with the contemporaneous
works (Abdellaoui et al. (2008) and Booij et al. (2010)).
(a) Weighting function for gain (b) Weighting function for loss
(c) Value function
Note:The red dash line is the prospect theory functions and the blue solid is 45o line
Figure 4.1: Estimated functions of prospect theory
The hypothesis of the coefficients in the loss domain being equal to the gain domain for both
value and weighting function was never rejected. There was no evidence that the coefficient
could not be equal. So these empirical results are in line with the theoretical evidence developed
by al Nowaihi et al. (2008). If we used this strategy, we have a bigger sample which makes our
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results a bit more robust. The table below shows a big difference between this new approach,
of using the same coefficients in the loss domains as in the gain domain. This one presents a λ
around 2. Which is much closer to the empirical mean.
Table 4.6: Estimated coefficients: Second approach





The median of the coefficients estimated for each valid observation. The empirical average is obtained by the
average of the median for each coefficient which other authors have find.
Both δ+ and γ+ were significantly equal to their literature mean (z=1.036, p-value= .300 and
z=0.342, p-value=,732 respectively) and α were not significantly equal to the literature average
(z=5.688, p-value=.000), but it was significantly equal to the contemporaneous mean (z=-.537,
p-value=.591). λ is not significantly equal to the average values of the empirical estimations.
However when testing if λ < 2 the test was rejected (z=3.134, p-value=.000) meaning that there
is some evidence that losses look twice larger than gains. This value is more in line with the
literature, however, as we said before, recent studies prooved that this value is in fact lower than
two.
4.2 Demographic Model
The results of the linear regression for the demographic variables are presented on the table
4.7. This table only shows the significant variables for each coefficient. All the non significant
variables were removed from the analysis.
It is possible to notice, that education, occupation and parents education of each individual
have a positive impact on the elevation of the probability weighting function in the gain domain.
The interpretation of these variables are that people with higher education, less experience of
work and parents also with high education are more willing to take more risks in the gain
domain.
According to Booij et al. (2010) “one may expect higher educated individuals to weight
probabilities more linearly”. To obtain the linearity of the probability weighting function, it is
not enough to assume a γ close to one in fact it is also needed to have a δ near one. Hence
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Table 4.7: Linear Regression for the Demographic Variables
Gains Losses Loss Av.
Coefficients δ+ γ+ α δ− γ− β λ
Constant -2.076 1.199 0.831 1.220 0.602 0.982 0.713







Education* 0,134 0.027 0.387
(.057) (.013) (.187)
Level of life -0.249
(.105)
* Variables are related to the parents
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. All this values are significantly at least 10%
it is possible to conclude that these results are in line with the literature. Assuming that the
parents education have the same interpretation as the education of an individual, it will be also
expected that the variable would have an impact on the elevation of the probability weighting
function. As shown in the previous table, this variable has indeed an impact on the elevation
in the gain domain but not as big as the education of the individual, for more detail about
this subject see Dohmen et al. (2005). There is also some evidence, in the gain domain, that
a full-time student is more willing to take risks than a student who also works and even more
than a working person. It is possible to conclude that a person which works for their money has
a bigger feeling of ownership than a person which gets his money from his parents. A student
is therefore more willing to take risks (bigger δ−) than a worker. With this new evidence it is
possible to actually see in practice the endowment effect.
The sensibility of the probability weighting function in the gain domain is given by the level
of life. This value can be seen in the γ+ coefficient. As seen before, the higher the value of
this coefficient the more close to the linearity the function is, which means the less sensitive the
person is in changes of probability. Taking table 4.7 in consideration it is possible to notice that
a person with better conditions of life is more sensitive in probabilities changes.
The interpretation in terms of level of life is that a person who considers to have a quality of
life better than the average has a probability weighting function less linear and more with a step
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shape form. An explanation for this could be that a person with more money is not so sensitive
as a non wealthy person. A small change on the probability does not have much of an impact
once the outcome that could result from that prospect does not make a big change on the quality
of life from that person. On the other and, a non wealthy person, have the same impact for
all level of probability, once any increase on the probability of winning, as little as it could be,
will have a positive impact on the quality of life for that person. Although this interpretation
could be correct, there are no other study which supports this. So to make this coefficient more
robust more studies about this should be made. Also this coefficient is not very reliable since
it resulted from questions aimed at understanding the level of life respondents perceive to have,
and was not made in terms of a numerical conclusion, like the IRS scale1. Unfortunately there
is no evidence of which kind of characteristics have an influence on the probability weighting
function in the loss domain. Booij et al. (2010) also stumbled with this problem. So, there is
evidence that in the loss domain there is no heterogeneity among the respondents.
The curvature of the value function in the domain of gains is measured by the α and this
coefficient is dependent of the parents education. Once this value is positive it means that the
higher the parents education, the higher the α, which implies a less concave function. Once the
concavity is related to risk aversion it means that people are more willing to take risks if their
parents had the opportunity of high levels of education which can be related to the life style
they could provide to their children. Once again there is no evidence that there is a relation
between the demographic variables and the curvature of the value function in the loss domain.
Finally, it seems that the loss aversion coefficient has a positive relation with the parents
education. As described before, a person with an higher loss aversion means that it has to gain
more for each unit that he might loose. This result is not in line with the findings of Booij et al.
(2010), they find that education is associated with a lower degree of loss aversion.
Taking into account al Nowaihi et al. (2008), we will also apply the demographic model when
the loss coefficients are equal to the gains. The major implication of the results, is because we
have a bigger sample which makes our results a bit more robust.
Comparing table 4.7 with 4.8 it is possible to notice that both econometric models point to
the same results. However there are two differences. In this last study α has no evidence that is
explained by the parents education, and also, that the loss aversion coefficient is not explained
1”Imposto sobre o Rendimento de pessoas Singulares” (IRS) is a Portuguese tax scale
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also by parents education but its explained by gender (male). Booij and van de Kuilen (2009)
affirms that the females are more loss averse than males but table 4.8 presents a different result,
whereby males have a larger loss aversion coefficient than females. So this last result is not in
line with the literature, so further investigation should be made in order to understand what
cause it.
Table 4.8: Linear Regression for the Demographic Variables: Second approach
Gains Loss Av.
Coefficients δ+ γ+ α λ
Constant -1.274 2.172 .899 2.025









Level of life -0,151
(.070)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. All this values are significantly at least 10%
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5. CPT Applications
Up to now, we have shown how the cumulative prospect theory describes the risk preferences
of a Portuguese sample and some demographic differences between those preferences, which by
itself is an important step to improve our knowledge about the risk decision made by the Por-
tuguese. However, if we want this theory to have a bigger role in measuring the risk preferences
of an individual it is extremely important to simplify the calculations presented in section 3.2.
As so, in a partnership with Silva (2012) we try to find a relation between the loss aversion
coefficient and the DOSPERT-Scale. This linkage between CPT and the DOSPERT-scale is
not enough to apply this theory to the financial markets. The theory that is commonly used
to choose the efficient portfolio, better known as ”Portfolio Selection” by Markowitz (1952) is
based on the expected utility theory so it is necessary to adapt it to the cumulative prospect
theory.
By overcoming these two obstacles it is possible for financial institutions to apply this theory
with a small price of implementation through the DOSPERT-scale and correctly find the market
efficient portfolio when the portfolio selection is adapted to the CPT. The next sections will
demonstrate how this can be accomplished.
5.1 CPT and DOSPERT-Scale
It is common sense that people react differently depending on the situations they encounter,
i.e. people do not follow the same logic when have to solve work-related or personal deci-
sions that involve risk and uncertainty. That is why Weber et al. (2002) had proposed a scale
(DOSPERT-scale, from now on DS) that examines risk-taking and its determinants in several
distinct content areas, as such financial decisions (separately for investing versus gambling),
health/safety, recreational, ethical and social decisions, and so, he could proved that “risk-
taking is indeed content-specific”. However we are not interested in studying all domains that
the DS covers. As explained, we just want to create a link between this scale, by predicting
the risk coefficient, and the cumulative prospect theory, with the loss aversion coefficient. To
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obtain the risk coefficient the survey described in section 3.1 had a second part consisting of
thirty questions where each individual had to respond for each situation, the possibility of they
perform a specific behaviour, in a scale from “1-Extremely Unlikely”to “7-Extremely Likely”.
Making the average, per domain, of the thirty questions, we can obtain a result from 1 to 7,
with 1 being the more risk averse possible and 7 being the more risk seeking possible.
Silva (2012) have found evidence of relation between the loss aversion coefficient with the
financial (0.334) and gamble (0.320) sub-domain coefficient both statically significant at 10%
but for the risk coefficient and the investment sub-domain coefficient the relation was low and
it was not statistically significant. With this first result we believe that it is possible to find a
relation with the financial and gambling coefficient and not to the risk and investment. As it
was expected there is a linear relationship between the financial coefficient which is significant
at 10% (p-value 0.047),with R2 of 0.111 and F-Statistic of 4.263 and there is also evidence of
a linear relationship with the gamble coefficient statistically significant at 10% (p-value 0.057),
with R2 of 0.102 and F-Statistic of 3.870.
λ = 0.775 + 0.334 Financial + ε (5.1)
λ = 0.877 + 0.320 Gamble+ ε (5.2)
This confirms that there is indeed a relationship between the financial and the gamble co-
efficient from the DS with the loss aversion coefficient from the CPT. On the other hand there
was no evidence of a relation with the risk and investment coefficients which makes possible
to make an interesting conclusion. If we can find a relation with the gamble coefficient and
not with the investment decision it is possible that the questions from where we obtained the
loss aversion coefficient triggers gambling decisions and not investment ones which was what we
intended. March and Shapira (1987) explained that managers differentiate between investment
and gambling decisions once the first involves decisions which requires a deeper reflection on
the decision making process and the later is based on luck. This conclusion obligates a deeper
study about the difference between this two domains and will probably require a reformulation
of the questions that usually are used to estimate the prospect theory coefficients.
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that we achieve the objective of creating a relationship
between CPT and DS with the financial coefficient, which will turn the problem of calculating
the loss aversion coefficient simpler.
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5.2 CPT and Mean Variance Applications
Once we overcome the difficulty of the loss aversion calculation we can turn our attention
to the next problem, the fact that theories involving the selection of the efficient portfolio
are based on the EUT. As stated, this theory does not fully explain the decisions preferences
of individuals. So, as the last objective of this work we will demonstrate the impact on the
investments decisions of an individual if we start using the CPT over the EUT. For this we will
adapt to the CPT, the most known investment decision rule under uncertainty, the Markowitz
(1952) Portfolio Selection.
The portfolio selection theory relies on an assumption that investors are interested in max-
imising the return for a given risk or, minimising the risk for a given return, which essentially
is the mean-variance rule (MV). Levy and Levy (2004) defined the MV rule as:
Definition 1 An investment F dominates G by MV if the expected value of investment F (µF )
is larger than G (µG) and the standard deviation of F (σF ) is equal or lower than G (σG). Note
that under normal distributions and risk aversion MV rule coincides with EU maximisation
(Markowitz (1952)).
µF ≥ µG and σF ≤ σG (5.3)
As the Portfolio Selection theory assumes normal distributions and the MV-rule, it is fair
to assume that the EUT is on the foundation of this theory, which Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) have proofed that individuals systematically violate. So we need a new decision rule that
correctly describes the individual preferences demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
known to have a S-shape value function and an inverse S-shape probability weighting function.
Levy and Levy (2004) have proposed a definition for this kind of curves called the Prospect
Stochastic Dominance (PSD).
Definition 2 Investment F dominates G for all S-shaped, non decreasing utility function (U ′(X) >
0 for all x 6= 0, U ′′(X) > 0 for all x < 0, and U ′′(X) < 0 for all x > 0) if the area enclosed
between the two cumulative distributions is positive for any range [x, x̄] with x ≥ 0 and x̄ ≤ 0.∫ x̄
x
[G(z)− F (z)]dz ≥ 0 for all x ≤ 0 ≤ x̄ (5.4)
29
In a more intuitive way, an investment F dominates G by the MV-rule if F have a higher
expected return and lower standard deviation as G. On the other hand F dominates G by
the PSD-rule if the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of F is to the right of G, this is,∫ x̄
x
[G(z)− F (z)] dz > 0. So, on the first sight, the MV and PSD dominance have no direct
relationship, i.e., one investment can have dominance by MV but not by PSD, or vice versa.
In appendix A.4 there is a figure which demonstrate both situations. However, in portfolio
context, Levy and Levy (2004) as proved that both stochastic rules have a very close relationship.
They had presented the following theorem1 when we assume the investors do not have distorts
probabilities.
Theorem 1 The PSD-efficient set is a subset of the MV-efficient set, and the segment of the
MV-efficient set which is excluded from the PSD-efficient set is at most the segment between the
minimum variance portfolio and the point of tangency from the origin to the frontier.
Figure 5.1: The MV and PSD efficient frontiers
This can be intuitively proved because, for one inefficient investment (F’) there is always
another with the same standard deviation but with a higher expected return (F), so it is obvious
that F dominates F’ by the MV rule and it also dominates by the PSD rule once the CDF of
F is the same as F’ but deviated to the right. And since the efficient frontier between the
minimum variance portfolio (O) and the point of tangency from the origin have steep slope (a),
1See the complete proof in Levy and Levy (2004)
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a small increase in the standard deviation is a big increase in the expected return, so the CDF
of the tangency portfolio will always be to the right of the portfolios below. Passing the point
of tangency the slope of the efficient frontier decrease, so the portfolio are no longer dominated
by portfolios to their immediate right (see figure 5.2).
However, we ca not disregard the distortions of probabilities. As proved by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) and also by the empirical study made in this work, the probability of an
outcome does not have a direct relation with the perception of a probability by an individual,
it as indeed a distortion. So Levy and Levy (2004) proposed a second theorem2.
Theorem 2 The objective probabilities are subjectively distorted by any transformation that
does not violate first-degree stochastic dominance, for example, the cumulative prospect theory
transformation. Then, the PSD-efficient set is a subset of the MV-efficient set.
Since the probability transformation may change the perceived portfolio mean and standard
deviation, it is not possible to restrict the MV to the PSD efficient curve as it was possible with
the objective probabilities. So a portfolio that is PSD efficient with objective probabilities can
be PSD inefficient when probabilities are transformed and vice versa.
5.2.1 The Empirical PSD efficient frontier
In this section we will apply this concepts to the Portuguese market to find the empirical
PSD efficient frontier. We will use the stocks that are included in the Portuguese index (PSI-20)
from September 2008 to September 2012, to produce the MV efficient frontier and then reduce
it to the PSD efficient frontier.
To reduce to the PSD efficient frontier we start from the minimum variance portfolio and
check if the portfolios to the right of them respect the PSD rule. To distort the probabilities




0.732p0.656 + (1− p)0.656
(5.5)
Until the portfolio is dominated by another to the right it can not be included in PSD efficient
frontier. The figure 5.2 presents the result we achieve with this methodology.
2See the complete proof in Levy and Levy (2004)
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Figure 5.2: The PSD efficient frontiers
In dark blue we have the PSD efficient frontier, and the light blue is the piece that is included
in the MV efficient frontier but not in the PSD. From this graph we can conclude that in fact,
the PSD efficient frontier does not include all the portfolios that are in the MV efficient frontier.
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6. Conclusion and Further Research
To the best of our knowledge, this study presents the first full estimation of the cumulative
prospect theory for a Portuguese sample. There are a few studies that made this kind of work
with a sample for different countries but it is interesting to know if the Portuguese follows this
theory, and this study confirms that actually it follows. It has also the advantage of knowing
the risk preferences from Portugal, allowing financial institutions to create financial products in
line with these preferences.
From the results it is possible to see that for the sample of Portuguese students under analysis
there is a S-shape utility function, concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss domain.
However there is also some evidence that this last one is closer to the linearity than convexity
which is in line with the most recent literature (Abdellaoui et al. (2008)). The coefficient of loss
aversion is below the average comparing to the literature. However, taking into account the tests
made, it is possible to say that the value of 1.256 is a good result in comparison with the recent
literature. The probability weighting function shows indeed an inverse S-shape which was what
it was expected and even more, the function for the loss domain is more elevated than in the
gains, which implicates a pessimism in both domains. This is one more proof of the validation
of cumulative prospect theory.
Our results seems to show some heterogeneity among the sample only in the gains domain.
People with more education (personally or from their parents) and less experience of work
(students and working students) are more risk seeking. On the other hand people with a lower
level of life are more sensitive to changes in the probability.
A limitation of this work is the size of the survey. With a small number of questions, we
do not make a very precise estimation of the CPT functional forms. With a few questions we
had to rejected all the observation that had a single mistake. With a bigger survey we can
allow the respondent to make one mistake thus having less number of rejected observations and
therefore a bigger sample to work with. As so we suggest, for future research, a survey with
more questions in every domain.
Another limitation of this work is the selection of the sample. We based our entire study in
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students of one single school which resulted in a sample with a low level of heterogeneity. It will
be interesting to extend this study to a larger population, in order to take an inference from the
Portuguese population, and also because it will turn the results more robust.
Another interesting subject for further research could be to define which is the method
more correct to calculate the loss aversion coefficient. With the method where there is different
function of gains and losses for the probability weighting function and the value function, or the
method where the same parameters are assumed for both curves in loss and gain domain.
We also shown that it is possible to link the loss aversion coefficient with the DOSPERT-
scale. This finding will improve the financial markets, and it will probably be the starting point
of implementation of cumulative prospect theory in the portfolio choice domain. We have also
extended this theory to the efficient frontier. As Levy and Levy (2004) proved, we find that the
efficient frontier is smaller than what we are used to know. Taking into account the distortions
of the probabilities, we have reduced the Portuguese market efficient frontier to one that is more
suitable for our sample.
Another limitation of this work is the assumption that the returns are normally distributed,
which does not correctly explains the financial series. The financial series have a higher kurtosis
than the normal distribution, so we suggested that in a future research to take this into account.
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A.2 Empirical estimates of prospect theory using different
parametric functionals
Functional form Estimates Properties* Authors
VF α β λ E T I N
v(x) = xα , if x ≥ 0 and− λ(−x)β , if x < 0
.88 .88 2.25 md c n 25 Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
.50 ml c n 420 Wu and Gonzalez (1996)
.49 md c n 10 Gonzalez and Wu (1999)
.89 .92 md c y 40 Abdellaoui (2000)
.61 .61 ml b n 2593 Donkers et al. (2001)
.91 .96 md c n 41 Abdellaoui et al. (2005)
.72 .73 2.54 md c n 48 Abdellaoui et al. (2007)
.81 .80 1.07 ml c y 90 Andersen et al. (2006)
1.01 1.05 md c y 181 Fehr-Duda et al. (2006)
.86 1.06 2.61 md c y 48 Abdellaoui et al. (2008)
.86 .83 1.58 ml m n 438 Booij et al. (2010)
Average Values .78 .87 2.01
PWF δ+ γ+ δ− γ−
w(p) = pγ/(pγ + (1− pγ))
1
γ
.61 .69 c n 25 Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
.71 c n 420 Wu and Gonzalez (1996)
.60 .70 c y 40 Abdellaoui (2000)
.76 .76 c y 90 Andersen et al. (2006)
w(p) = δpγ/δpγ + (1− p)γ
.77 .69 c n 40 Tversky and Fox (1995)
.77 .44 c y 10 Gonzalez and Wu (1999)
.65 .60 .84 .65 c y 40 Abdellaoui (2000)
.98 .83 1.35 .84 c n 41 Abdellaoui et al. (2005)
.87 .51 1.07 .53 c y 141 Fehr-Duda et al. (2006)
.77 .62 1.02 .59 m n 438 Booij et al. (2010)
w(p) = exp[−δ(−ln(p))γ ]
.74 c n 40 Wu and Gonzalez (1996)
.413 .413 b n 2593 Donkers et al. (2001)
Average Values .80 .63 1.07 .65
*Properties: E(estimator): median(md); maximum likelihood(ml); T(task): choice; matching; I(incentives): yes
(random lottery incentive scheme); no (fixed or no payment) Table withdraw form the paper Booij et al. (2010)
40
A.3 Estimators value for each individual
δ+ γ+ α δ− γ− β λ
1 1,15 0,38 0,59 0,82 0,79 0,80 0,32
2 2,96 0,51 0,88 0,66 0,39 0,98 2,50
3 1,10 1,01 0,70 0,95 0,74 1,02 0,58
4 0,50 0,72 1,04 0,92 0,43 1,12 1,26
5 1,06 0,83 0,92 0,70 0,92 1,30 0,22
6 0,43 0,61 0,86 0,76 0,73 1,05 0,63
7 0,96 0,93 0,83 0,81 0,66 0,97 1,25
8 1,36 0,70 1,07 0,96 0,73 0,97 4,97
9 0,66 0,52 0,88 0,92 0,50 0,93 0,59
10 0,70 0,64 0,99 1,14 0,66 0,95 2,08
11 1,24 0,74 0,90 1,13 0,69 1,09 1,01
12 1,00 0,97 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,00 1,00
13 0,45 0,61 0,67 2,57 0,31 0,93 0,29
14 0,22 0,56 0,93 2,33 0,66 1,15 0,24
15 0,29 0,65 0,82 2,09 0,59 0,84 0,83
16 0,42 1,28 0,91 1,23 0,87 0,83 1,75
17 0,94 0,66 0,94 0,78 0,73 1,05 1,60
18 0,74 0,82 0,84 1,19 0,97 0,81 2,55
19 0,25 0,96 0,84 0,66 0,35 0,76 2,05
20 0,61 0,64 0,87 0,78 0,90 1,10 0,28
21 1,12 0,50 1,13 0,62 0,45 0,96 8,16
22 0,54 0,69 0,74 1,10 0,55 1,09 0,11
23 0,94 0,53 0,88 2,63 0,34 1,26 0,28
24 0,56 0,51 0,85 5,53 1,70 1,21 0,08
25 1,17 0,75 1,14 0,77 0,76 1,09 2,91
26 0,30 0,27 0,78 2,31 0,65 0,82 0,37
27 1,05 0,52 0,63 0,20 0,43 1,24 0,14
28 0,96 0,40 0,95 1,33 0,36 1,04 0,57
29 0,73 0,53 0,84 0,77 0,43 0,97 1,08
30 2,19 0,31 0,89 0,71 0,40 0,97 1,74
31 0,26 0,66 1,02 0,85 0,71 1,02 1,17
Median of
Coefficients
0,732 0,656 0,880 0,936 0,661 0,972 1,256
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A.4 PSD and MV decision rule
Figure A.1: MV and PSD dominance investments
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